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Ghanaian Law: Its Evolution and
Interaction With English Law
HARRISON A. AMANKWAII*
Introductory Note
When young Thrasymachus challenges Plato and offers his definition
of justice as that which is in the interest of the stronger person, perhaps
he speaks as a pragmatist who has no patience for such utopian views as
those held by Plato himself and Polemarchus, his friend, who thinks jus-
tice means giving each person his due.' That Thrasymachus' stance is sup-
ported by reality is illustrated by the fact that conquerors from ancient
times are wont to impose their own laws on vanquished people and it is
a well recognised principle of international law that "duress" does not
vitiate a treaty entered into between conqueror and conquered.
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I. ACQUISITION OF GHANA BY BRITAIN AND THE
INTRODUCTION OF ENGLISH LAW.
Dr. T. 0. Elias has said: "It is an established principle of British con-
stitutional law that the question whether, and if so to what extent, Eng-
lish law should be introduced into a foreign territory under British rule
depends on the manner of its acquisition."3 The standard treaties on the
mode of acquisition of new territories have often enumerated the follow-
ing methods:
(i) Settlements,
(ii) Ceded territories,
(iii) Conquered territories,
(iv) Protectorates and Protected States, and
(v) Trust territories.4
#BA., LL.B. (University of Ghana) ; LL.M., (Cornell); Barrister at Law and Solicitor
of the Supreme Court of Ghana.
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 56 (1966).
2. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 891 (8th ed. 1955).
3. THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (1963).
4. 5 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 544 et seq. (3rd ed. J953).
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 4, No. 1
In the case of settlements, a good example being Australia, the fiction
that Englishmen carry their law with them wherever they go makes the
introduction of English law into a settled colony a matter of course;
and the law which the English thus take with them includes the common
law of England, equity and statutes of general application in force at the
time when the newly-acquired colony was constituted. It has also been
said that only so much of the English law is applicable, as is suitable
to the circumstances of the colony.5 In other acquisitions, English law
is introduced not by settlers, but by express legislative enactments.
The Gold Coast Courts Ordinance Cap. 4 (1876) was of this type. The
question, therefore, as to the extent of the application of English law in
these cases must be resolved by reference to the constituting legislation.
It should be noted that before 1876, Ghana had had contact with white
European traders (among whom were the Danes, Dutch, and Portuguese)
dating back to the fifteenth century, and that British jurisdiction actually
began in 1821 when "the several forts on the Gold Coast (later Ghana)
formed part of the territories of the Corporation of the Company of
Merchants trading in Africa which was created and subsidised annually
by Parliament."' However, the beginning of the Ghana legal system may
be traced to 1884, the year in which the Fanti Bond was signed between
Commander H. W. Hill, the head of the then - British Colonial adminis-
tration representing the British Crown and "some Fanti chiefs." 7
The critical date in the annals of Ghanaian constitutional and legal
history was July 24, 1874, when the first local legislature was established.
It was on that date when English law was first (officially) introduced into
the Gold Coast, now Ghana. Earlier in the same year the bellicose Ashanti
had been defeated by the British and had renounced their claim to the
coastal areas around Elmina and Cape Coast. The chiefs of these places
had signed the 1844 Fanti Bond with the British. After some hesitation
the British two years later passed the Gold Coast Courts Ordinance8
which contained the relevant laws for our purposes. This Ordinance
was revised in 1935, and repealed by the Courts Act (1960) 9 which
5. Kino Hoa Leong v. Khoo Chong Yack [1930] A.C. 346; Maleksulton v. Sherlia Jovai
[1947] JA.L. 58, at 65; [1955] 22 E.A.C.A. 142; see also BLACKSTONE, 1 COMIENTARIES
107.
6. W. DANIELS, THE COMMfON LAW IN WEST AFRICA 4 (1964).
7. See generally W. CLARIDGE, A HISTORY OF THE GOLD COAST AND ASHANTI, (1945);
and W. WARD, A HISTORY OF THE GOLD COAST (1948).
8. Gold Coast Courts Ordinance 8 [1876] Cap. 4.
9. Enactments of the Ghana Legislature are numbered consecutively beginning from
Act I. Some of the numbers are preceded by the letters C.A. (Constituent Assembly) of
which there are twelve. The Constituent Assembly was a quasi-legislative body which
was acting between the period of the dissolution of the "Independence" Legislature
and the promulgation of the Republican Constitution which brought into being the
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superseded it. The Courts Acts itself was also repealed by the Courts
Decree 1966.
It is necessary to note for the purposes of understanding the nature of
customary law, that what is today known as Ghana consists of fragmented
tribal groups of territories which the British acquired piecemeal. The
Gold Coast Colony, which was formerly administered with Nigeria, con-
sisted of the coastal towns where the British retained the forts built by
the Danes and the Portuguese, and was acquired by treaties of cession and
"friendship," an example being the 1844 Fanti Bond. Ashanti was ac-
quired by conquest and declared a protectorate after the 1900 rebellion.
The Northern Territory was declared a protectorate in 1912. The Volta
Region, formerly a German possession, came to the British after World
War I as a mandate territory; after a U.N. supervised plebiscite on the
eve of Ghana's independence, the Volta Region became part of Ghana.' 0
Ghana thus represents an amalgam of three modes of acquisition:
cession, protection, and trust.
II. THE SOURCES OF ENGLISH LAW AND CUSTOMARY LAW
Sec. 8311 of the Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance provides:
Subject to the terms of this or any other Ordinance, the common law, the
doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application which were in force
in England on the 24th day of July 1874 shall be in force within the jurisdiction
of the Courts.
Sec. 8512 provides:
All Imperial laws declared to extend or apply to the jurisdiction of the Courts
Republic of Ghana. This Assembly was the old National Assembly.
The rate at which the numbered enactments are growing convinces the author that
very soon it will be cumbersome to cite a statute by its number. Consequently enact-
ments are referred to in this work without regard to their corresponding numeric
serials.
10. For a complete history see R. BENNIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw oF GHANA, Chapter
1 (1962) and also the following enactments; The Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti
(Legislative Council) [1948] Stat. R & 0 1946 No. 353 Vol. IX, 673; Northern Terri-
tories Order in Council [1901]; The Gold Coast (Constitution> Order in Council
[1950] Sta. Instr. 1950 No. 2094; The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council [1957]
Sta. Instr. 1957 No. 277.
11. Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance [1876] § 83, Cap. 4. Though the Ordinance
had been amended several times and finally repealed by the Courts Act [1960], §83 was
saved both by the Courts Act [1960] and the Courts Decree [1966] which has now re-
placed the 1960 Act. §93 (2) of the 1966 Courts Decree reads: "The provisions relating
to Admiralty jurisdiction, infants, persons of unsound minds, probate and matrimonial
causes, and statutes of unequal application which were in force in England on 24th
July, 1874 and applicable to Ghana immediately before the commencement of this
Decree, shall continue to apply on and after such commencement until such provisions
are modified, amended or revoked under this Decree." (Emphasis added)
12. Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance [1876] §85, Cap. 4.
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shall be in force so far only as the limits of the local jurisdiction and local cir-
cumstances permit, and subject to any existing or future ordinances of the
Colonial Legislation....
Sec. 8613 provides that in time of conflict between the rules of the com-
mon law and equity, those of equity should prevail.
Sec. 8714 provides for the application of native law and custom. It
reads in part:
Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the courts of the right to observe and
enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit of any native
law or custom existing in the Gold Coast, such law or custom not being repugnant
to natural justice, equity and good conscience nor incompatible either directly or
by necessary implication with any Ordinance for the time being in force. (Em-
phasis added).
Such laws and customs shall be deemed applicable in causes and matters where
the parties thereto are natives and particularly, but without derogating from
their application in other cases, in causes and matters relating to the tenure
and transfer of real and personal property, and to inheritance and testamentary
dispositions, and also in causes and matters between natives and non-natives where
it may appear to the court that substantial injustice would be done to either party
by a strict adherence to the rules of English law .... (Emphasis added).
The section goes on to provide that if from the nature of a transaction
it appears that the parties intend English law to govern their rights and
obligations under the transaction, the court should apply English law.
The import of Sec. 89 is that customary law should be proven by
evidence as a fact. It was in this respect treated as foreign law.
It should be noted that while the only limitations on the application
of English law in its proper sphere were non-retroactivity and the pro-
vision that English law should be applied "so far only as the limits of the
local jurisdiction and local circumstances permitted," customary law was
under several disabilities, the most important being that:
(i) It applied primarily between natives;
(ii) It applied primarily to inter-personal relationships - land transactions,
inheritance and succession, marriage and divorce;
(iii) It applied only where in the opinion of the court it was not contrary to
equity and good conscience;
(iv) It applied only where it was not contrary to an existing imperial enactment,
and
(v) It was provable by evidence as a fact.
Some customs were proscribed altogether because they were said to be
barbaric and objectionable to good conscience and morality. 15
Inevitably, difficulties were experienced in the application of this
statute not only with reference to the customary law provisions, but also
the English law provisions. For example the courts had to grapple with
18. Id. §86.
14. Id. §87.
15. A locus classicus was panyarring or Adwo which was the custom by which a
person on failing to make good a debt or some such other obligation, allowed one
member of his family to be kidnapped and held until the debt was defrayed or obliga-
tion cleared. The Bond of 1844 proscribed this custom. (See CLARIDGE, supra note 7,
at 452, for the text of the Bond). Human sacrifice was likewise forbidden.
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the interpretation of "statutes of general application."' 6 Does the phrase
"in force in England on the 24th day of July 1874" refer only to the
"statutes of general application" (on the assumption we know the mean-
ing of this) or extend to "common law" and "rules of equity" also?17 The
courts were faced with the problem of the definition of "native." Would
a West Indian of African descent who had lived in Ghana for sixty-one
years be regarded as a Ghanaian native?' 8
Meanwhile there were problems about what meaning should be put on
words like "wife,"' 9 or "child."20 Should these be given common law
meaning or not? The Courts Act 1960 was designed to remove some of
these difficulties.
But before looking at the law as it is now, perhaps it will not be out
of place to investigate briefly the nature of customary law and why the
British, while recognizing its existence, placed so many limitations on its
application.
III. THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Perhaps some of the modern nationalist fervor apparent in African
legislatures today may be traced in part to a reaction to the attitudes
of the old colonial powers. More specifically, the British in the days
before Ghana's independence often expressed the opinion that there was
no native law. This attitude was due to a basic failure to discern the
bases and nature of native customary law. While this statement would
have been true in the case of certain tribes which existed without any
chiefs, the acephalous tribes, it was not true of the tribes which had
chiefs, the cephalous tribes.2 ' Among the latter are the Ashanti of Ghana,
the Yorubas of Nigeria, the Zulus of South Africa and the East African
tribes of Tswana, Bunyoro, Ngwato and others. These societies have
16. De Bordes v. De Bordes [1884] Sar. F.C.L. 267; Dede v. African Association Ltd.
[1910] 1 N.L.R. 131; Oknaku v. Oknaku [1947] 12 W.A.C.A. 137; Young v. Albina
[1940] 6 W.A.C.A. 180.
17. On this A. ALLOTr, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 21 (1960) says: "It is not only in
regard to the 'statute of general application'- whose very sobriquet indicates this
requirement- that we must inquire whether the English law received or potentially
be received into a colonial territory is of general application. This requirement extends
also to the common law and equity of the territory." He cites, however, no authority for
the proposition. See also G. SAWYERR, EAST AFRICAN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 120(1967).
18. Brown v. Miller [1921] F.Ct. 1920-21, 48, F.Ct. See also Savage v. Macfoy [1909],
Ren. 504.
19. See Lord Panzanco in Hyde v. Hyde [1866] L.R. 1 P & D 130.
20. Edet v. Essien (1932) 11 N.L.R. 47.
21. FORTES and EVANS-PRiTCHARD, AFRICAN POLITICAL SYsTEis 5 (1961). See also T.
EIAs, THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 17 (1956).
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"centralized authority, administrative machinery and judicial institu-
tions - in short, a government ... ,"22 The acephalous group, which in-
cludes the Tallensi of Northern Ghana, the Nuer, and the Tiv of Nigeria,
lack central government. Though these tribes have no legal structure, it
by no means follows that the remaining tribes are so lacking.
Members of cephalous societies did not go to court merely to find
a man of wisdom and authority who could help them in arriving at an
amicable settlement. They went to court because a political authority
called on them to do so for the exercise of its authority. There is a
distinction between criminal offenses and civil delicts. On this, Mr. J. N.
Matson, former Judicial Adviser in Ghana, writes:
Akan (the Ashantis of Ghana customary law recognised two classes of acts giving
rise to judicial proceedings: those causing danger (Spiritual more often than
mundane) to the community, either as a whole or in the person of its head; and
those causing harm only to individuals.23
Sir Henry Maine cannot therefore be right (at least in respect of Akan
law) when he says, "the penal law of ancient communities is not the law
of Crimes, it is the law of Wrongs, or to use the English technical word,
of Torts."24 This is not to say court actions were not preceded by private
negotiations to reach amicable settlement. Indeed the majority of cases
which ended up in the chief's court went up there because private
negotiations failed to produce a settlement. In fact it was considered un-
neighborly to rush to the King's court without first "exhausting local
remedies." 25 And it is misleading to call these private attempts at set-
tlement arbitration, because a person may recede before such an award
is made in settlement while this will not be countenanced at arbitration
proper.2 6
Among the Akans of Ghana, farming on the earth spirit's day of rest,
drawing water on the stream spirit's day, certain sexual offenses such as
incest or sexual relations with the chief's wife or doing any act considered
disrespectful of the chief personally, and taking human life were crimes
punishable by the entire community represented by the chief.2 7 The
22. FORTES and EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 21, at 5.
23. Matson, Judicial Process in the Gold Coast, 2 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW QUARTERLY 47, at 48 (1953).
24. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 379 (1906).
25. This compares with the practice in Medieval England where the custom and the
law was that; "If any complaint (quorimonia) should arise between burgesses, the
plaintiff ought to demand thrice at the defendant's house that he should do him right
and whatever law required; and if at the third demand satisfaction is refused, let him at
length make a reasonable complaint to the justice of the town." Borough Customs 189.
Quoted in T.F. PLUNCKNETT, A. CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMNION LAW 383 (5th ed.
1956).
26. See Kwasi v. Larbi (1953) A.C. 164 and Allott's Legal Note on it in 2 INTER-
NATIONAL & COMiPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 466 (1953; see also Beattie, Informal Judicial
Activity in Bunyoro, 9 J.A.A. 188 (1957).
27. See DANQUAH, AKAN LAWS AND CUsToMs passim (1928).
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chief's court is seised of a civil cause when, after attempts at amicable
settlement have proved fruitless, one of the parties makes an "oath"
usually the mentioning of an abominable thing. This is considered a
,.curse", "ntam ka" which, unless attended to promptly, is believed to
cause disaster. The parties are therefore brought before the chief who
would adjudge the matter.28
Among the Buganda of Uganda there is evidence of a political organi-
zation of that country in the nineteenth century. Not only was the
authority of the great king, the Kabaka, felt through administrative agents
but also through the elaborate judicial system wherein appeals lay from
smallest local court to the Kabaka's court.
On the judicial structure, E. S. Haydon says: "... ancient Buganda
had a great variety of judicial tribunals connected in a pyramidal struc-
ture so that appeal lay from the minor chiefs through the great chiefs
to the Katikkiro (Prime Minister) and thence to the Kabaka. .."-'
Among the Buganda as among the Ashanti there is a distinction between
crime and tort.
Among the chiefless, or acephalous, societies on the other hand, be-
cause of the absence of a central authority, there does not seem to be any
distinction between crime and tort and the function of law is amicable
settlement by conciliation although there may be the right to resort to
self help where an offense charged is serious enough.30 It may be true of
these non-hierarchical tribes that they went to court only to find help
in arriving at an amicable settlement.
In view of the overwhelming evidence of political organization in
some African societies and some mode of administration of justice how-
ever crude, and the recognition of these legal structures by colonial
powers, we may now ask: what is the real nature of the law in these
African societies?
The analytical positivist may be disappointed because traditionally
some tribal laws would not bear any resemblance to the commands3' of
a political sovereign (whether the sovereign be a monarch or a legisla-
ture) in a politically organized society regulating the social conduct of
the subjects. Today however, enacted laws are introducing changes and
variations into customary law to the extent that some customary laws
may be said to be commands.
32
28. MATSON, supra note 23, at 50.
29. E. S. HAYDEN, LAW AND JUSTICE IN BUGANDA 11-12 (1960).
30. C. C. EvANs-PRITcHARD; THE NUER, passim (1940).
31. John Austin has said in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that "Laws proper, or
properly so called are commands," i.e. laws "set by political superiors to political
inferiors." Reproduced in Professor C. MoRmIs, THE GREAT LEGAL PHiLOSOPHERS 336-37(1959).
32. See W. TWINING, The Place of Customary Law in the National Legal Systems of
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 4, No. 1
Traditional customary law is deeply rooted in the habits and usages
of a people. Dr. Dundas says customary law
is the experiences of generations which successively have cast this and that aside,
tried many methods and found them to fail until at last some course remained
open which proved itself the most workable and acceptable, not because it met
merely one requirement, but because it fitted into all other circumstances. There-
fore it is a deeply thought-out code, and the experiences and intellect of genera-
tions have worked to make it one link in a chain of usages and ideas. For the
law as approved by custom is but part of the mechanism of society. 3 3 (Emphasis
added)
Dr. Allott says it is unwritten and not the work of a legislature or law-
giver; "the rules of law trace back to the habits, customs and practices of
the people which engender and support the norms expressly formulated
from time to time for the decision of disputes;" and that it is flexible.3 4
Mr. Justice Ollennu says: "basically the customary law is a usage or
custom which exists in a particular locality or community and is ac-
cepted as binding upon the people of that community."3 5
Incidentally, none of the Colonial Ordinances defined customary law
except the Gold Coast (Colony) Native Courts Ordinance 1944. It reads:
Customary law means a rule or body of rules regulating rights and imposing cor-
relative duties being a rule or body of rules which obtains and is fortified by
establishing usage and which is appropriate and applicable to any particular
cause, matter, dispute, issue or question.36
This is also embodied in the Eastern Region of Nigeria Customary Law
(1956). This definition is good because of the word "fortified," for
if the people abandon a usage, the custom departs; indeed as the Full
Court said in Lewis v. Bankole; "one of the most striking features of
West African native custom ... is its flexibility; it appears to have been
always subject to motives of expediency, and it shows unquestionable
adaptability to altered circumstances without entirely losing its indi-
vidual characteristics."37 No wonder, therefore, that this definition of
customary law was accepted by the Privy Council in Eleko v. Officer
Administering the Government of Nigeria. That court said: "It is the
assent of the native community that gives custom its validity, and there-
fore barbarous or mild, it must be shown to be recognized by the native
East Africa. Lectures delivered at the University of Chicago Law School in April-May
1963.
33. Dundas, The Organisation and Laws of some Bantu Tribues in East Africa, 45
JNL. Roy ANTH. INsT. 234, at 305-6 (1915).
34. A. ALLOTr, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 62 (1960). This is subject to the quaifica-
cation that some customary laws have become inflexible today as a result of the court's
adherence to the 'stare decisis' principle. Some customary law is today "written" as a
result of the system of law reporting. Codification is also being done in some African
countries today. See TWINING, supra note 32.
35. Ollennu, Law of Succession in Ghana, 2 U. GHANA L. J. 4, at 11 (1965).
36. Gold Coast (Colony) Native Courts Ordinance [1944] Cap. 98, §2.
37. Per Osborne C. J. [1909] 1 N.L.R. 81, at 100-101.
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community whose conduct it is supposed to regulate."3 8
From what has been said above it is now possible to list the elements
in African customary law.
(i) Traditional customary law derived from the habits and usages of the people.
(ii) Though ancient customary law was unwritten and definitely not the work
of a law-giver, in its modern form, some of it is written and may be at-
tributed to the work of a law-giver.
(iii) It was the assent of the people which made traditional customary law
obligatory.
(iv) The law's past flexibility has been affected today by the courts' compliance
with the "stare dedsis" principle; consequently some of it may be said to
be "inflexible" now.
IV. BRITISH ATTITUDE TO NATIVE TRIBUNALS
Although the British authorities recognized native law and did every-
thing they could to preserve it, at first they did not take cognizance of the
judicial authority of the native tribunals which administered native law
prior to their advent. Later on, however, they lent their recognition to
the existence and authority of these native courts.
A. PHASmE ONE: 1821-1927
This was a period of direct administration of justice in the Gold Coast
colony by the British.3 9 There was direct responsibility for adjudicating
matters and the customary judicial authorities were unrecognized or at
best tolerated. The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 40 for example, would
not allow the administration of justice to the natives of the Gold Coast
through indigenous tribunals.
In this phase the British incursion into local politics was limited to
dispensing justice on an irregular jurisdictional basis and the Supreme
Courts Ordinance41 was silent on the question of native tribunals.
Cruickshank said early in the period: 42
Indeed we (the British) had no legal jurisdiction in the country whatever. It
has never been conquered or purchased by us, or ceded to us. The Chiefs, it is
true, had on several occasions, sworn allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain;
but by this act, they only meant the military service of vassals to a superior. Native
law and custom were never understood to be abrogated or affected by it...
This was the time when it was said: 43
38. Elako v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria [1931] A.C. 662 at 673.
39. A. ALLOTr, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW, Chapter 5 (1960); Allott, Native Tribunals
in the Gold Coast 1844-1927, 1 JA.L. 163 (1957>; BANsON, supra note 10, at 3 et seq.
40. Native Jurisdiction Ordinance [1878].
41. Supreme Courts Ordinance [1876].
42. B. CRUICKSHANK, TWENTY YEARS ON THE GOLD COAST (1953).
43. Select Committee 1842, Report (i), (iv), (v).
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The Judicial Authority in the forts resides in the Governor and Council who
act as Magistrates, and whose instruction limit them to the administration of
British Law, [sic] and that as far as the natives are concerned, strictly and ex-
clusively within the forts themselves; but practically, and necessarily, and usefully,
these directions having been disregarded, a kind of irregular jurisdiction has grown
up, extending itself far beyond the limits of the forts by the voluntary submission
of the natives themselves, whether Chiefs or Traders to British Equity, and its
decisions, owing to the moral influence, partly of the respect which has been in-
spired by the fairness with which it has been exercised by Captain MacLean and
the Magistrates at the other forts, have generally .. . been carried into effect
without the interposition of force.
Captain MacLean, President of the Committee of Merchants, had said
British justice "has had the happiest effect in maintaining peace, en-
couraging agriculture and commerce and promoting the civilization of
the natives." He extolled the system: "Let but the local government deny
or cease to administer even-handed justice to the population for a single
day, and the whole country would again become a scene of warfare,
rapine and oppression."44
B. PHASE Two: 1927-1944
In this period native tribunals and customary law came to be overtly
recognized.4 5 This was the era of Indirect Rule.46 The British found that
their hold on the natives would be stronger if they utilized traditional
institutions - the Chiefs and their courts. This presupposes the ac-
ceptance of native courts as direct machinery for adjudication of disputes
among the natives without interference from British administration.
C. PHASE THREE: 1944-1958
This was the period in which Native Courts were created and regu-
lated by statutes. The British authorities created the courts by statutes,
defined their jurisdiction and areas of competence, defined the appli-
cable laws and made provision for their supervision by higher tribunals.
This was exemplified by the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance Cap.
98 (1944). The Native Courts which were graded A, B, C, and D ad-
ministered customary law in the main with limited criminal jurisdiction.
Appeals lay from these to the regular or superior courts, 47 in the parallel
English system of courts.
44. J. SARBAH, FANTI NATIONAL CONSTITUTION 95 (1897).
45. See for example, Native Administration Ordinances [1927].
46. Elias, The Evolution of Law and Government in Modern Africa in African Law
185, 187 (Kuper & Kuper ed. 1965).
47. Elias, Colonial Courts and the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent 18 M.L.R. 866
(1955). AFurKA-INSTITUUT, CUSTOiARY LAW IN AFRICA (1956) particularly the articles
by Arthur Phillips, Dr. Ajayi and the Colonial Office (African Studies Branch).
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The final phase of this whole process culminated in the integration
of courts systems. We shall treat this in Section VII.
V. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE COURTS IN THEIR
ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW.
Reference has already been made to the disabilities which harassed
customary law in its application in its proper sphere.
Native courts were generally empowered to administer the native law
and custom prevailing in the area of their jurisdictions. 48 In addition
they were empowered to apply any law binding between the parties ex-
cept where the parties had agreed or could be taken to have agreed that
the transaction should be governed by English law. This would appear
to empower the courts to apply some customary law other than that pre-
vailing in their area if such other law was binding between the parties.
These provisions were repeated in the Local Courts Act of 1958.09
Native Court personnel were supposed to know the law; indeed as
native Africans they were repositories of the law. However, to the extent
that their decisions were subject to the supervision of administrative
officers, judicial advisers and magistrates, which supervision was not
limited to procedural matters, their knowledge of the law was liable to
challenge by these officers. It is thought, however, that such supervision
was generally limited to procedure and remedies.
What we see in operation today, therefore, is a system of courts and a body of
law which have deep roots in traditional society and culture but which have been
modified, particularly in the direction of more regular organization and pro-
cedure by years, of colonial administration. It is significant that such modifica-
tions have been slight enough and gradual enough so that the Basoga may feel
that these are still their courts and their laws. Certainly to the outside observer
this appears to be true.50 (Emphasis added>
This remark about the Basoga judicial system was true of the Ghana
situation at least up to the time the Courts Act 1960 was passed.
As regards the higher courts, they were allowed free resort to chiefs
and other persons with special knowledge of customary law, and to books
and manuscripts recognized as authoritative on customary law. They
were also empowered to refer cases dealing with native customary law to
native courts for their decision. The decisions of native courts on custo-
mary law had no binding force either on the customary courts themselves
or when such matters come before the higher courts. The Evidence
Ordinance of Nigeria provided however, that judicial notice could be
taken of a custom, with respect to any circumstances and it could then
48. Native Courts Ordinance §15.
49. Local Courts Act [1958].
50. Fallers, Customary Law in the New African States, 27 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
Pnour.Ms, 605, at 614 (1962).
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be adopted as part of the law governing those circumstances. 51 The power
to refer to persons knowledgeable in customary law has been taken to
indicate that native law always required proof. Thus for example in
Limbani v. R 52 it was held that the mere decision of a native court that
a particular custom exists does not establish that custom. But the Privy
Council stated in the Ghanaian case of Angu v. Atta53 that, "In the
Gold Coast Colony the principal customs as to the tenure of land have
now reached the stage at which the courts recognize them and the law
has become, as it were, crystallized." Their Lordships went on,
As is the case with all customary law, it has to be proved in the first instance
by calling witnesses acquainted with the native customs until the particular cus-
toms have, by frequent proof in the courts, become so notorious that the courts
will take judicial notice of them.54
Earlier it was held in Hughes v. Davies55 that, "As native law is
foreign law, it must be proved as any other fact." (Emphasis added)
This vaccillation on the part of the English courts in recognizing
customary law in its own right, and their equation of it with custom
as that word is understood in English law56 had two unfortunate results.
The attitude of regarding custom as a fact worked injustice between
parties. It also placed native law in an inferior position in the corpus
juris of the country57
VI. COMMON LAW AND EQUITY
Meanwhile the common law and equity were tempering "justice with
mercy" in the sphere of customary law. In particular, customs regarded
as barbaric or tainted in any way with indecency were proscribed.58 Thus
for instance in two Nigerian cases, Edet v. EssienG9 and Chawere v.
Aihenu & Johnson6 the "repugnancy rule" was applied to the Yoruba
custom that if a woman was married under customary law and had a
child with another man while the dowry paid on her by the husband
51. Cap. 68, §§14, 15, 61, 62. See also Mr. Justice Butler Lloyd's dictum in Buraimo
v. Bamgboyo [1938] 14 N.L.R. 42, 44, on the effect of a notorious custom.
52. [1946] N.L.R. 6.
53. [1916] P.C. 1874-1928, 43, 44
54. Id.
55. (1909) Ren. 550, 551.
56. At common law custom must have the qualities of antiquity, certainty, reason-
ableness, continuance, peaceable enjoyment, obligatoriness, and consistency. C. ALLEN,
LAW IN THE MAKING 127-35 (4th ed. 1946).
57. Allott, The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in British Africa, 20
M.L.R. 244, at 257 (1957).
58. See A. ALLOTr, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAw Chapter 7 (1960); DANIELS, supra note 6
at Chapters 10, 13; BENNION, supra at note 10, Chapter 12. Hannigan, The Imposition
of Western Law Forms upon Primitive Societies, COMPARATIVE STUnEs IN SocIgry AND
HISTORY 1 (1961).
59. [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47; see supra note 18.
60. [1935] 12 N.L.R., 4
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remained unrefunded, the child was to be regarded as belonging to the
husband of the woman and not to the natural father. In the first case
a woman married under native law left the husband to live with another
man. She had two children by this other intruder, the respondent. The
respondent did not refund to appellant, as custom then required, the
money which the appellant had paid as bride money on the wife. Ap-
pellant therefore claimed the two children. It was held that to uphold the
claim would be contrary to natural justice. It was inequitable to allow
the appellant to claim another's natural children simply because the
other man had deprived the appellant of his wife without paying dowry
for her. In the Chawere case, the first defendant was originally the wife
at customary law of one from whom plaintiff seduced her. Plaintiff then
paid to the husband twenty pounds which were said to be the dowry.
The woman later left the plaintiff to live with the second defendant.
Plaintiff, now claiming that the woman was the wife of the second de-
fendant, demanded twenty-four pounds and ten shillings "being dowry
paid on the first defendant to her first husband and also for the purchase
price of a sewing machine given by the plaintiff to the first defendant."
The court said of this claim:
If the suggestion is that there is a native custom by which a wife who commits
adultery, ipso facto of the adultery becomes automatically the wife of the adulterer,
I have two comments to make. First, that there is no evidence of such a custom,
and second, that I am clear that such a custom is one to which this court would
not be prepared to give judicial sanction.61
In the Ghanaian case of Sarteng v. Darkwan62 the issue was whether
the child of a slave woman should be considered a member of the father's
family for the purposes of succession. The court held contrary to custom
that the child of a slave is a member of the father's family and that to
hold otherwise would be to uphold the institution of slavery which was
not only abolished by statute but also repugnant to the common law
of England.
Not only was English law, both common law and equity, concerned
with the problem of refashioning local rules of law, but also equitable
decisions were enforced in the strict English sense. This conflicted with
local practices. The maxim nemo iudex in sua re, a man should not
judge his own case, flew in the face of situations where a chief or other
authority might often adjudicate on breach of his own decree or a wrong
to his personal right. The maxim alteram partem audi, both sides of
a case must be heard, might conflict with some customary practice be-
cause although in ancient African law a man was generally given an
opportunity to be confronted with his adversary, the institutions of
61. Id at 5.
62. Sarteng v. Darkwah [1940] 6 WA.CA. 52, at 53.
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"oath" and "ordeal" might lead to a man's condemnation without an
effective chance of putting his own point of view across. The maxim
that decisions should be supported by reasons might b6 violated where
a man's guilt was made to depend on the ordeal device. And there might
be no way of finding whether the rule that punishments and awards
should not be excessive, but should be proportionate to the circum-
stances of the offense was always observed.63
The word equity was not only interpreted to mean fair play. It was
also interpreted technically to mean that rules formerly administered
in the Court of Chancery such as constructive notice and laches were
applicable to customary law at least where procedural matters were in
issue. An example of the application of the rule in Willmott v. Barber
(1880) 15 Ch.D. 96 is the 1923 case of Ephraim v. AsuquoOt where
plaintiff sought to revoke a grant of letters of administration after a
lapse of two years or more. The court found him guilty of laches. In
delivering the opinion of the court Justice Webber of the Divisional
Court of Calabar observed:
It is now nearly two years since this grant was made. The plaintiff and his
people have had every opportunity of opposing the grant, of which opportunity
they have not availed themselves. If they were anxiously desirous of administering
this estate, why did they wait a whole year to make this first move, and why did
they wait another twelve months before getting the case on the hearing list?05
VII. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE
On March 6, 1957 the Gold Coast won its independence from Britain
under its new name, Ghana. By an Order in Council issued in the same
year the West African Court of Appeal ceased to be an appellate court
for Ghana.66 Ghana established her own appellate court - the Court of
Appeal of Ghana - from whence appeals lay direct to the Privy Coun-
cil.67
Though the legal structure was undergoing a change customary law
still was initially left in an inferior status. But in 1960 with the promul-
gation of the Republic Constitution and the Courts Act, the change was
complete. Indigenous law should not be relegated to an inferior position
in its own land. This attitude on the part of the new Republic savors
63. See generally A. ALLoTr, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW, supra, note 17 passim.
61. [1923] 4 N.L.R. 98.
65. Id.
66. S.I. 1957 No. 279.
67. The West Africa (Appeals to Privy Council) Order in Council (S.I. 1957, No.
1362) ; The Ghana (Appeals to Privy Council) Order in Council (S.I. 1957 No. 1361).
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of nationalism, but is understandable since not only did the Republic
Constitution establish a Ghana judiciary completely autonomous and
without links with the British Judiciary,68 but it also made Ghana a
sovereign nation which owed no allegiance to the British Crown. Pro-
fessor Harvey holds the view that what was dominant in this period of
change was the value of "nationhood" and not "nationalism," because
"the effort through legal, political and social means has been to create
the perception of a new value and to organize its expression internally
rather than to implement externally a set of developed and articulate
national aims." 69
68. Article 41 reads: "Superior and inferior courts - (1) There shall be a Supreme
Court and a High Court, which shall be the superior courts of Ghana. (2) Subject
to provisions of the Constitution, the judicial power of the State is conferred on the
Supreme Court and the High Court, and on such inferior courts as may be provided
for by law. (3> The power to repeal or alter this Article is reserved to the People."
(Emphasis added).
Perhaps a short history of the evaluation of the court system will not be out of
place here. By the Supreme Court Ordinance 1876, as amended I Laws of Gold Coast c.7
(1920), the Supreme Court of Judicature was created for the Gold Coast colony "and
for territories thereto near and adjacent wherein Her Majesty may at any time before
or after the commencement of this Ordinance have acquired powers and jurisdiction."
Id S. 12. The Court comprised the Full Court - the appellate tribunal - and Divisional
Courts sitting in each of the administrative provinces of the colony. Appeals from
the Full Court lay to the Privy Council. In 1928, the West African Court of Appeal
was established as the penultimate Court of Appeal for British dependencies in West
Africa, with jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the Supreme Courts of Gambia,
Gold Coast Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 1 Laws of Gold Coast c.5 (1937), as amended.
The Gold Coast judiciary was reorganized by extending the Supreme Court Ordinance
of 1876 to the later accretions to the British jurisdiction namely, Ashanti and the
Northern Territories, thereby creating one Supreme Court for the whole colony. Thus
immediately prior to independence (March 6, 1957) the highest tribunal situated in
the Gold Coast was the Supreme Court from which appeals lay to the WA.C.A. and
thence to the Privy Council.
The Courts (Amendment) Ordinance [1957] created the High Court and the Court
of Appeals as component parts of the Supreme Courts, and abolished the right of
appeal to the West African Court of Appeals whose appellate jurisdiction was trans-
ferred to the Court of Appeal. However, the Privy Council retained its ultimate appel-
late jurisdiction. Ghana (Appeal to Privy Council) Order in Council, 1957, Laws of
Ghana No. 387 (1957). The Republic Constitution (July 1, 1960) again reorganised the
Ghana Judiciary. There are now two Superior courts - the High Court and the
Supreme Court. The right of appeal to the Privy Council was abolished by the Consti-
tution (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1960. The Supreme Court is today the Court of
last resort in Ghana. Article 42 (4) of the suspended Republic Constitution reads,
"The Supreme Court shall in principle be bound to follow its own previous decisions
of the Supreme Court on such questions, but neither Court shall be otherwise bound
to follow the previous decisions of any court in questions of law."
For a scholarly exposition of the problems of "stare decisis" raised by this article, see
Asante, Stare Decisis in the Supreme Court of Ghana, I U.G.L.J. 52 (1964).
Since the suspension of the 1960 Constitution following the takeover by the military
and the police, the law in this regard has been embodied in Part I of the Courts
Decree, 1966.
69. Harvey, A Value Analysis of Ghanian Legal Development Since Independence,
1 U. of Ghana, L.J. 4 (1964).
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The change has begun and will continue. As a result of the report
of the Korsah Commission on Native Courts, the Local Courts Act (1958)
was passed to provide for the establishment of Local Courts in place of
Native Courts. This Act began the work for the eventual fusion of the
court systems. What it did was to bring the former native courts under
the same court hierarchy with the regular courts.70 They had limited
jurisdiction and applied customary law in personal actions where the
debt, damage or claim did not exceed fifty pounds. Appeals lay from
these to the Magistrate or Circuit Courts and thence to the High Court.
This Act was repealed by the 1960 Courts Act which completed the
fusion of courts process. This Act was in turn repealed by the Courts
Decree 196671 which has reenacted the 1960 Act substantially.
Section 1 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Decree there shall be -
(a) a Supreme Court of Judicature, consisting of the Court of Appeal and
High Court, which shall be the Superior Courts of Ghana; and
(b) the following Inferior Courts -
(i) the Circuit Courts,
(ii) District Courts of two grades designated District Courts (Grade
I) and District Courts (Grade II) and
(iii) such other Inferior Courts as may be provided by law.
The dichotomy of courts system is dead. A fusion of courts such as oc-
curred in England in mid 19th century between the common law courts
and Chancery has occurred in Ghana also between the native courts and
the successors of the English courts. But the question remains to be
answered: what is now the relationship between the common law and
equity on the one hand and customary law on the other? The suspended
1960 Republic Constitution throws some light on the question.
Article 40 of that Constitution provides:
72
Except as may be otherwise provided by an enactment made after the coming
into operation of the Constitution, the Laws of Ghana comprise the following:
(a) the Constitution,
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established
by the Constitution,
(c) enactments other than the Constitution made by or under the authority of
the Constituent Assembly,
(d) enactments in force immediately before the coming into operation of the
Constitution,
(e) the common law and
(f) customary law.
This list does not pretend to present in order of precedence the laws of
Ghana. It only indicates the sources of the law of Ghana and the fact
70. Harvey, The Evolution of Ghana Law Since Independence, 27 LAW AND CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMs 281 (1962).
71. Courts Decree [1966] N.L.C.D. 84, Courts Act [1960] CA. 9.
72. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana [1960].
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that customary law is listed last is not a derogation from its status. Article
40 of the Constitution does not answer the question posed however.
The Interpretation Act 1960 defines the common law thus:
(i) the common law as comprised in the laws of Ghana, consists in addition to
the rules of law generally known as the common law, of the rules generally known
as the doctrine of equity and of rules of customary law included in the common
law under any enactment providing for the assimilation of such rules of customary
law as are suitable for general application. 73
Here is an attempt on the part of the legislature to incorporate some
customary" law into the common law.7 4 Section 18 of the Act75 provides:
Customary law as comprised in the laws of Ghana, consists of rules of law which
by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana, not being rules in-
cluded in the common law under an enactment providing for the assimilation of
such rules of customary law as are suitable for general application.
Customary law properly so called is, therefore, "provincial". There are
many tribes and each has its own peculiar customs. There are the Akan
(Ashanti, Fanti, Akim, Kyerepong, Akwamu and Kwahu), Ewe, Ga-
Adangbe and the Tallensi. These are only the principal tribes - there
are over two hundred tribes in Ghana.
The Courts Decree provides a set of rules for determining whether
in a particular case customary law or the common law should apply.
Since customary law is no longer under any disabilities - it being equal
to rules of common law and equity and of general application - it fol-
lows that it applies to both natives and non-natives; and unless care is
taken the application of customary law in certain circumstances may
work injustice, especially where aliens are concerned.
Section 64 of the Courts Decree76 provides:
(1) Subject to the provision of any enactment other than this subparagriph, in
deciding whether an issue arising in civil proceedings is to be determined according
73. The Interpretation Act [1960] CA. 4 §17.
74. As far as the author is aware not one such enactment exists. This was to be one of
the greatest contributions of the Chiefs to the nation's legal development. See The
Chieftancy Act 1961, §58. But the Nkrumah government, bent on building a strong
central government and a unitary state from a large number of tribes effectively under-
mined the authority of the Chiefs. The Houses of Chiefs were no more than debating
clubs. The District Commissioners who were the "political watchdogs" of Dr.
Nkrumah's ruling party, the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) were more influential
than local magnates because traditionally they have been forces around which the
people rallied. The example of Ashanti is a clear indicator. Here because Sir Agyeman
Prempeh III supported the National Liperation Movement (N.L.M.), the strongest
pre-independence opposition party to the C.P.P., more than 80% of the Ashanti also
belonged to this party. See Asante, Law and Society in Ghana, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 1113
(1966).
This situation, it was rightly feared, would lead to 'divided' allegiance with serious
consequences for the infant Republic. Consequently the Chiefs were unable to make
any worthwhile contribution to the legal development of the nation in the way en-
visaged by §58 of the Chieftancy Act.
75. The Interpretation Act [1960] CA. 4 §18.
76. Courts Decree [1966] N.L.C.D. 84.
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to the common law or customary law and if the issue is to be determined according
to customary law, in deciding which system of customary law is applicable, the
court shall be guided by the following rules, in which references to the personal
law of a person are references to the system of customary law to which he is
subject or, if he is not shown to be subject to customary law, are references to the
common law.
Rule 1
Where two persons have the same personal law one of them cannot by dealing
in a manner regulated by some other law with property in which the other has
a present or expectant interest, alter or affect that interest to an extent which
would not in the circumstances be open to him under his personal law.
Rule 2
Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of a transaction the parties to which
have agreed, or may from the form or nature of the transaction be taken to have
agreed, that such an issue should be determined according to the common law or
any system of customary law effect should be given to the agreement.
In this rule 'transaction' includes a marriage and an agreement or arrangement
to marry.
Rule 3
Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of any unilateral disposition and it
appears from the form or nature of the disposition or otherwise that the person
effecting the disposition intended that such an issue should be determined ac-
cording to the common law or any system of customary law effect should be
given to the intention.
Rule 4
Subject to the foregoing rules, where an issue relates to entitlement to land on
the death of the owner or otherwise relates to title to land -
(a) if all parties to the proceedings who claim to be entitled to the land or
a right relating thereto trace their claims from one person who is subject to
customary law, or from one family or other group of persons all subject to the
same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;
(b) if the said parties trace their claims from different persons, or families or
other groups of persons, who are subject to the same customary law, the issue
should be determined according to that law;
(c) in any other case, the issue should be determined according to the law
of the place in which the land is situated.
Rule 5
Subject to Rules 1 to 3 where an issue relates to the devolution of the property
(other than land) of a person on his death it should be determined according to
his personal law.
Rule 6
Subject to the foregoing rules, an issue should be determined according to the
common law unless the plaintiff is subject to any system of customary law and
claims to have the issue determined according to that system, when it should be
so determined.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
paragraph, but subject to the provisions of any other enactment
(a) the rules of the common law relating to private international law shall
apply in any proceedings in which an issue concerning the application of law
prevailing in any country outside Ghana is raised;
(b) the rules of estoppel and such other of the rules known as the common law
and the rules generally known as the doctrine of equity as have heretofore been
treated as applicable in all proceedings in Ghana shall continue to be so
treated.
Many of the rules envisage that effect should be given to the intention
of the parties to a transaction. Therefore, whether both of the parties
are natives or non-natives, as far as the court is able to ascertain their
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intention, effect would be given to it and either customary law or com-
mon law would apply.
On the misleading appearance of clarity and certainty of these rules
Professor Harvey says:
•.. [T]he use of the concept of personal law in a legal order based primarily on
the concept of territoriality of law introduces great complexity. Many of the legal
norms of Ghana are applicable within the geographic boundaries of the nation.
The common law and the general systems of customary law are 'personal', how-
ever, and their application depends on the particular persons involved. Surprising-
ly the Courts (Decree) is entirely silent as to the criteria by which one's 'personal
law' is to be determined. Presumably this determination must still be made on the
basis of such ethnic factors as determined the jurisdiction of the former Native
Courts, that is, is the person of African descent? Is his way of life that of a native
community? If so of what native community is he a member? While the legislative
draftsmen were able to avoid the use of the word 'native', the concept of the
personal law seemingly commits the courts to criteria reminiscent of the colonial
period in answering the choice of law questions.77
Professor Harvey, however, has a word of praise for the legislation.
He thinks the status of the common law is improved by the elimination
of the former presumption favoring the applicability of customary law
where the parties were natives.
Section 65 of the Decree makes provision for the ascertainment of a
customary law rule either by inquiry, testimony of experts, or written
opinions of chiefs. One may ask whether the time has not now arrived
for the codification of customary law since this would ensure certainty;
the present method of ascertainment of customary law, it may be argued,
still makes customary law a provable fact. On this issue there are several
views, but it is submitted that codification would do more harm than
good.
Codification of Customary Law now might, on the one hand, minimize if not
bar altogether any chances of progressive development to meet the ever changing
conditions in society and thus amount to an attempt to make the regulations of
human conduct in modern life subject to a kind of mummified ancient law. It
might on the other, (as codification usually involves alterations in existing law)
lead to another of those futile attempts 'to make people good by Act of Parlia-
ment'.7 8
An example of the progressive development of customary law to meet
changing conditions is this: before 1909 it was almost anathema to regard
a woman as head of family among the Yorubas. Nevertheless under
77. See Harvey, supra note 70, at 599-600.
78. AFRIKA INSrTUuT, THE FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA 66 (1956). In spite
of the support for codification among Western writers (among the most notable are
Allott, Anderson, Cotran and Gower) there is very little support for the idea of codifi-
cation among African jurists. At the African Conference on Local Courts and
Customary Law held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika, September 1963, the delegates to
the Conference noted that "customary law codes are rare" - Records of Proceedings
25, note 1. The model code which was studied-The Natal Code- was adversely
criticised by the delegates who thought it was a failure. No recommendation on codi-
fication was made by the Conference.
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changing conditions the Full Court gave judicial sanction in Lewis v.
Bankole 9 to the female headship of a family in Lagos. It did so on the
basis of evidence which proved the lady's personal capacity for leader-
ship though ordinarily "the Yoruba social structure is patrilineal and
patrilocal and their rules on family headship generally primogenital in
operation." s0 Of course, nothing prevents changes to be made to a writ-
ten code, when new developments necessitate alteration in the existing
law. Unfortunately written codes sooner or later become sacrosanct, and
almost defy changes.81
It will be seen that English law has impinged on African customary
law in two ways:
(i) in its modifying influence on those parts of indigenous customary law which
have not so far succumbed to the invasion of British legal and cultural
influences
(ii) in its role of filling in the gaps (creative role) and supplying the deficiencies
of indigenous law and usage brought about by new economic and com-
mercial values, and national development goals.
The first category concerns such phenomena as changes in property
law (for example, corporate and inalienable ownership becoming grad-
ually individual and alienable), the increasing, though gradual, break-up
in the customary ties of family and lineage with a resultant narrowing
in the individual's sense of obligation towards his kin. The second em-
braces the introduction of criminal law and procedure, commercial law
- banking, insurance, bills of exchange, corporations, - and industrial
law regulating the relationships of those who control capital and the
means of production and wage-earners - originally an unknown group
in indigenous society.
It will be mentioned in passing that it may be interesting to compare
the British policy of conferring on customary law an inferior status with
the policy of other colonial powers, notably France, Belgium and Portu-
gal which determine the applicability of customary to individual natives
of their colonies by reference to their status. There is the process82
variously called "assimilation", "immatriculation" and "evolution" in
French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies whereby a native upon attain-
ing a defined level of "civilization" changes his status. He ceases to be
subject to native law and becomes localized French, Belgian or Portu-
guese. His relationships with others thenceforth become subject to con-
tinental law. Dr. Cowen says the "status system" avoids the dilemma in
which customary law finds itself in other colonial territories where jus-
79. [1,09] 1 N.L.R. 81.
80. AJAYI, supra note 47, at 69.
81. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 264 (2nd ed. 1959).
82. See generally, Cowen, African Legal Studies - A Survey of the Field and Role
of the United States, 27 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 543, 556 (1962); A. ROBERT,
in CuSTOMfARY LAW IN AFRICA 170.
1970/Ghanaian Law
tice is administered on racial lines - English law for non-natives and
customary law for natives. He admits however that "admission to the
status of immatriculation became that of 'middle-class respectability in
a typical Belgian city' " after 1948 in the former Belgian Congo.8 3
The retention of English law as part of the Ghanaian legal system
after independence stems from the people's acknowledgement of the fact
that English law has played a significant role in shaping the entire legal
and political conditions of the society. It has had profound ameliorating
effect on customary law. It has given Ghanaians their sense of constitu-
tionalism and legalism.84 It has become an important institution in the
structure of the society. It could not simply be done away with. Beyond
all this is the general acceptance of the law by the vast majority of the
people which alone gives it a binding character. The people believe
also in the English law's ability to do justice between people of different
clime and culture, subject of course to the qualification that local circum-
stances should be taken into account in its application.
Its retention may also be due in part to expedience and the desire
to maintain the "status quo". If English law were discarded, existing
legal relations already entered into on the basis of the existing legal
order would have been disturbed.
83. Supra note 82, at 556. See further GOWER, INDEPENDENT AFRICA 9 (1967); E. N.
GviswoLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE U.S.A. 105-107 (1964).
84. J. N. SHKLAR, LEGALISiM 180 (1964).

